There were several factors: i) people were led to believe that it was a bipolar election, that is, the only possible decision was to vote for PAN or to vote for FRG; ii) the vast majority of the population rejected PAN, for its economic measures and arrogance (it was perceived as the party of the rich); iii) the left could not propose a unified strong platform, which was the only way of becoming "the third option;" iv) the left also failed with its discourse, which did not challenge the neoliberal model, and was replaced by FRG as the real opposition party; and v) Portillo developed a personal charisma that enthused the poor sectors and even attracted some leftists to work with him.
It is true, but there are some preliminary explanations that should be tested with research in the field. First, the composition of the population in those areas was changed by repression in the 1980's: a significant number of inhabitants and most of the leaders were forced to leave and relocate somewhere else, while the army imposed a new leadership aligned with it (basically those in charge of the civilian patrols). Second, the populist appeal that Portillo used did attract large masses of non-politicized poor that happen to be in clear majority, raising now the specter of a neofascist model. Third, in many of those towns the vote in the first round of elections went in favor of the ANN, and only in the second round they went to Portillo. I find two reasons for that: the PAN was considered the party of the rich, which did not deserve any support; and second, many people thought that it was not smart to confront the forthcoming government, given that it was not feasible to defeat the FRG. In any case, social and political research is a must, in order to better understand rural response to politics, as well as to prepare a new center-left strategy for the next elections.
Our first problem is the definition of "the left." Participating in the left there were also political opportunists, who always prefer to side with the winner. A good number of ex-members of the Partido Revolucionario, within the FDNG, falls into this category (as a matter of fact, it is clear now that one of the reasons for the ANN split in July 1999 was that the ANN leadership preferred to eventually support PAN, while FDNG's Secretary General Rafael Arriaga secretly aligned himself with Portillo). They even expressed public support to Portillo after the first round of elections. Other members of the left found themselves in disagreement with the actions of the URNG/ANN, and not being able to favor PAN, ended voting for Portillo (naively, they claim that they favor Portillo, but not Rios Montt and the FRG). Finally, some leftists were personal friends of Portillo's --from the time he, himself, was a leftist-- and believed that their presence at his side was necessary in order to counterbalance Rios Montt and hard-liners within the FRG. It must be recognized that both Portillo and Rios Montt have been audacious in appealing to "progressive persons" to join the government.
In general, the appointments have been a result of the internal negotiations among the three currents within the FRG led by Portillo, Paco Reyes (the vice-president leads a private sector's group) and Rios Montt. However, the President has had the most power in appointing several positions. For appointing these officials Portillo has based his decisions on two elements: persons he trusts, and persons who may attract or moderate important sectors of society, as long as they are accountable to him. In the first category, most of the Christian Democrats in the Executive Power fall. In the second category, one can find Otilia Lux de Coti, indigenous intellectual and former commissioner of the Historical Clarification Commission (whose appointment was designed to satisfy Rigoberta Menchu and Rigoberto Queme, Quetzaltenango's Mayor); Edgar Gutierrez, former director of REMHI and the government's delegate to the Accompaniment Commission for the peace accords (he replaces Gustavo Porras) and a few others who accepted to work with Portillo (Ronald Ochaeta and Rosalina Tuyuc were also invited, but there is no confirmation whether they have accepted to join the government or not).
Analysts and the media have commented on the fact that the traditional positions held by CACIF's appointees, such as the Ministers of Finances, Economy and Agriculture, were given to persons Portillo trusts, without taking into consideration CACIF's candidates. This is partially true, because it is also clear that none of the appointees was directly opposed by CACIF. However, there seems to be a distance between CACIF, which embraced neoliberal policies as a whole and mainly supported PAN, and the FRG. Nevertheless, the economic support that Portillo built during his campaign will not suffice to exert real control on the economy if he does not get his full acceptance by CACIF. At this stage, there seems to be an arm wrestling between the two sides, which could bring a little more autonomy to the government in economic matters. Of course, a second stage will come in the negotiations between Portillo and the World Bank/IMF.
Again, the key aspect is trust. The previous army's leadership was partly the one that agreed to sign the Firm and Lasting Peace Accord minus the most open generals, like Balconi. The previous Minister of Defense, General Espinosa, even before his appointment was able to displace officers he did not like and appoint those who strengthened his position. Clearly, Portillo could not trust any of the generals and equivalent position, who endorsed the PAN government, and less to select one of them as Minister of Defense. Rios Montt learned in 1982 that opening the door to lower-ranking officers would bring a significant support and militancy by younger cohorts, and later in 1983 that the old leadership could still turn against him. Portillo is opening the door to the younger officers, but at the same time he is taking the old leadership off positions of command. Finally, a good number of colonels and lower-ranking officers were not totally pleased with the peace accords --particularly their provisions regarding the transformation of the army-- and turned to the FRG for military fundamentalism.
The previous leadership will be bought with good retirement conditions and perhaps a few diplomatic appointments. General Espinosa, who was Arzu's right hand, will be happy if he is left aside in the investigation of Bishop Gerardi's assassination and other crimes he seems to be implicated in (he was named by MINUGUA as the officer responsible for the forced disappearance of "Mincho," a URNG militant in 1996). The new leadership will consolidate itself and may continue with the image of reforming the armed forces. They will go along with the proposed turning over of the Minister of Defense to a civilian, a step that Rios Montt favors (although the solution so far presented, due to the rejection of the constitutional reforms last May, is to give the civilian Minister the rank of army General). However, the army will have a stronger position if Portillo, as people fear, gives more and important roles to the armed forces, guarantees impunity for violators of human rights, and attempts to uplift the army’s prestige (Portillo is already building up a military case against Belize, because of recent border incidents).
By the time Portillo made the promise that he would clarify this crime within his six first months in office, he already had all the information he needed to blame officers of the army for this, probably with the intention of embarrassing Espinosa and Arzu, himself (remember that Edgar Gutierrez and Ronald Ochaeta were in charge of the Church's investigation of the crime; as a matter of fact, the information that Ochaeta disclosed outside Guatemala in 1998 may have been provided by Rios Montt's allies within the army). Recently, there was a meeting between Portillo and the Guatemalan Conference of Bishops; according to the news, he asked for the Catholic Church's support in economic matters, but there is no doubt that he also asked the Church to stand by him in the clarification of the crime (diplomats and MINUGUA possess information that some right-wing members of the Church may also be involved in the assassination plot or cover-up). After Portillo's electoral promise and his first actions regarding this case, it seems certain that the crime is going to be solved soon. This is going to be an additional coup against PAN.
This is a totally different story. He is surrounded by people who have responsibility in past human rights violations, both military personnel and civilians, who are not willing to be publicly questioned (even former officers who opposed Rios Montt rushed to the FRG, once its strength was assessed). I don't see yet what the strategy for guaranteeing impunity is going to be. Portillo might stress compliance with the recommendations of the CEH's report (which do not seek justice) and solving the case of Gerardi, with no action at all regarding prosecution of past repressive policies. Eventually, he might also seek a full amnesty, probably by Constitutional mandate. The FRG has been insisting on the need for convening a Constitutional Assembly, in order to fully reform the Constitution. It wants, among other things, to pave the way for Rios Montt's presidential aspirations. The Assembly would be autonomous and able to define mechanisms of "pardon and reconciliation," which could make it impossible to prosecute those responsible for human rights violations.
Combating crime should not be that difficult. Many of the criminal organizations, involved with kidnapping for ransom, car thefts, bank assaults, and smuggling had active or former army officers within, most of them close to assistants to Rios Montt. Those organizations may be brought to order, by convincing their leaders to halt operations, or by attacking them, as in the case of Jorge Zimeri, who was recently captured. Portillo needs these acts of propaganda. It may become more difficult to control the drug-trafficking business, with strong international ties, but he will not hesitate about strongly acting against it. In terms of drug dealing and corruption, he has accepted the offer made by the U.S. Government to finance and cooperate with the Guatemalan security forces (he seems to favor expanding the army’s role to drugs interdiction). For the first year of government, no widespread corruption is expected; additionally, the salaries of members of Congress were increased by Q5,000/month, in order to prevent bribes and gifts. Portillo and Rios Montt, who want to build Messianic images, will not fall easily or soon into corruption practices.
Alfredo Moreno was in jail under the accusation of running from the Customs Office a smuggling ring that made him immensely rich; but he was recently freed by a judge, who said that his guilt had not been proven. This would be in total contradiction with anti-corruption efforts, unless the case against Moreno had been fabricated by Arzu's government with the purpose of damaging Portillo. It is a very complex case for Portillo: not only has he reiterated a personal friendship with Moreno and admitted having received gifts from him, but he understands that public opinion perceives Moreno as guilty. If Moreno's innocence does not exist or cannot be demonstrated, Portillo will lose all his anti-corruption credibility, and probably more than that.
As usual, when salaries are increased, by any means, a public debate will ignite. The private sector opposes it: CACIF as a matter of principle (workers have no rights) expresses fear of inflation and losing jobs; small business, however, point to the fact that they may not be able to comply with the increase, mainly after a year of no banking credits. Workers, in general, welcome the measure, because present salaries cannot allow them to cope with the cost of living. Nevertheless, trade unionists and progressive analysts argue that just a salary increase, with no other measures, will not be enough to alleviate the problems of the vast majority of salary-dependents, and even less for the population at large. The measure was suggested by the main donor to Portillo's campaign (the donor's son is working very closely with Portillo) in a memo that was recently leaked to the press. Portillo admits that the memo was sent to him, but says that the decision was his. Clearly, the purpose was to act according to his populist, Peron-style, image: the President that cares for the poor. However, he is confronting some internal resistance to this measure: FRG's members of Congress have shown hesitations about approving the measure in the way Portillo presented it. In the meantime, the currency exchange rate has gone up from Q7.60 to Q 8.00 per dollar, and prices are increasing as if the salary increase had already been granted.
Guatemala will certainly undergo unpredictable and often confusing changes as the various currents within the government attempt to take hold of the situation. Politically, the country will have a reversal of the past four years: before, PAN was in full control, and the FRG was systematically opposing the government's measures; today, the FRG is the force in power, and the PAN is set to erode the government's position. In both cases the left's role was and is "constructive opposition," not sufficiently understood by the population. The future is very uncertain, a situation that will be aggravated by authoritarian-style measures to which the FRG is prone. At this stage, the press affirms that thousands of public employees have been dismissed because of their sympathy for PAN. Portillo's promises to attend to the needs of the vast poor majorities and fully comply with the peace accords are precisely the measures opposed by his main economic and military supporters. The traditional factors of power in Guatemala -- the military, the very rich, and foreign political and economic interests--have a long history of imposing their will, often through violent means. In human rights aspects, opposition has surged in the FRG to the implementation of the Code for Children and Youth, despite of the intense efforts by many organizations and the Christian Churches to reach a consensus draft. Portillo may claim that he has already exercised his power over two of these real powers: the army and CACIF. By appointing two colonels as Minister and Vice-Minister of Defense, he produced the immediate separation of 20 generals or equivalent-rank from positions of command. He also disregarded CACIF’s candidates for the ministries and other positions that have traditionally been under its domain. I must stress, however, that the changes in the army’s leadership do not necessarily mean a more democratic and less repressive military. Likewise, the private sector may lose a battle but it will not abandon its many means of exerting strong pressures on the government, counting on the additional pressures that the World Bank and the IMF might exert. Most importantly, if this government is not capable of solving urgent social and economic problems, the new army's leadership and CACIF will be ready to join efforts again, in order to crush any rising discontent by repressive means. The lessons from Guatemala, as well as those coming from Argentina, Ecuador, Venezuela and partially Chile, are indicating that the neoliberal economic model in place has generated an overwhelming rejection of the political parties responsible for their implementation. A mixture of popular outrage and renewed military interventionism is on the rise and it would not be surprising if a wave of neofascism emerged. In Guatemala, people's trust in political parties and "electoral democracy" continues to fade, and although populism has been the electoral answer this time, more frustration of the nascent hopes of the Guatemalan people may have serious consequences. In the past four years, there were already groups talking about the possibility of a new armed struggle. Consolidating the peace accords in Guatemala, the path to firm and lasting peace, requires major structural changes to improve the lives of ordinary people, and I don't see yet that the FRG is willing or capable to deliver.
New York, February 3, 2000
Raul Molina Mejia